Channel's lxmf.delivery
destination hash (prepended to the LXMF tail before deserialisation).
Channel's derived Identity (holds the private key used to EC-decrypt).
EC-encrypted channel message (no channel-hash prefix, no stamp).
Reticulum instance whose transport caches the sender identity (work doc #37: there is no class-level shared cache anymore).
Decrypts and reconstructs an LXMF message from a channel
inner_blob.Inverse of wrapChannelMessage: EC-decrypts with the channel identity, verifies the RTID magic, extracts the embedded sender public key, and feeds the reconstructed LXMF wire block to
Message.deserialize. The sender identity is cached via the transport's instance-scoped cache (work doc #37) so subsequent messages from the same sender validate without the prelude.The prelude key is bound to the message before anything is remembered: the key's own
lxmf.deliverydestination hash must equal thesource_hashtaken verbatim from the LXMF tail, or the post is rejected and nothing is cached (RFed/SPEC.md "Key binding" — without it, anyone who knows the channel name could overwrite a contact's cached key). The returnedsignatureValidis then the integrity check of the accepted post: a forgedsender_identity_pubproduces a signature mismatch.